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1. LANGUAGE AND LOGIC 
This section may be viewed as an attempt at modelling inexactness and approximation in scientific 
inquiry, through the construction of a special multi-valued logical system designed as a formal 
framework for scientific theories. In particular this system will be used in the other sections of this 
paper, as a framework for axiomatic utility theory. 
We build our logical system in three steps: first, we introduce the formal language and its 
structures; second, we provide computation rules for truth-values of formulae in structures for the 
language; third, we define a semantic notion of deduction based on the idea of reducing errors and 
approaching truth. Between steps we explain the motivation and intuition behind our logic and 
draw attention to comparisons with other logics. 
Our formal language L is an ordinary first-order language with variables, predicate symbols, 
connectives and quantifiers. We shall use bold-faced lower-case roman letters for variables and 
predicates of L. Thus, e.g. x, y, z with or without subscripts, are variables of L, while pm, where m 
is a positive integer, is an m-place predicate symbol of L (we omit the subscript when we deal, later 
on, with certain specific predicates which we denote by b, i, p, u). The connectives of L are 1, v , 
A, + (read: “not”, “or”, “and”, “implies”, respectively) and the quantifiers are 3 and V (read: 
“for some” and “for all”, respectively). 
If m is a positive integer, pm an m-place predicate symbol of L and (xi,. . . ,x,) a sequence of 
variables of L, then p,(x, , . . , x,) is an atomic formula of L. Compound formulae of L have the 
form 11(/, I(/ v 0, $ A 8, $ + 8, 3x$ or Vxtj, where Ic/ and 0 are (atomic or compound) formulae 
of L and x is a variable of L having a free appearance (i.e. not within the scope of a quantifier) in 
$. Lower-case Greek letters, cp, I/, 8, will be used throughout the paper to denote arbitrary formulae 
of L. Commas and parentheses may be added to formulae of L for ease of reading. 
A structure 55 for L consists of a non-empty set X (the “domain” of .%) and for each m-place 
predicate symbol pm of L a [0, l]-valued function pm on X” (the “interpretation” of pm in 9). We 
use ordinary lower-case roman letters for elements of X (x, y, z, with or without subscripts) and 
for interpretations (e.g. p,) of predicates of L in 3. An interpretation of an m-place predicate of L 
in !Z is thus a multi-valued m-ary relation on X. The values of the interpretation pm in [0, l] are 
“truth-values” of the atomic formula p,,,(xI,. . . , x,) of L. We shall soon formalize this idea and 
extend it to compound formulae of L, but first we want to explain what truth-values mean to us. 
Our logical system, as we said above, is meant to be a modelling of imprecision and approximation 
in science (and a framework for scientific theories). Thus, we perceive truth-values as representing 
degrees of error (or inexactness). Where a formula attains the value 0 (no error) it is fully true, and 
where it attains the value 1 (maximalerror) it is fully false. In general, the lower the truth-value 
the truer the formula (as the closer it is to being error-free). 
What we have here, and as a result also in the rules below for compound formulae, is a reversal 
of the traditional way of looking at multi-valued logic. (In particular, our semantic rules reverse 
those of the familiar Lukasiewicz logic and its extensions, as can be found in, for example, 
Lukasiewicz and Tarski [l], Rose and Rosser [2], Chang [3] and Hay [4].) In this, we follow the 
ideas of Scott, who in Refs [S, 63 speaks about “degrees of inexactness”, and of Giles, who in Ref. 
[7] and subsequent papers (including a comment on Scott’s paper [6]) speaks about “degrees of 
risk”. As regards compound formulae, we say that: an “or” assertion minimizes the error while an 
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“and” assertion maximizes it (and similarly for quantified assertions); the error in an implication 
assertion is the degree to which the antecedent is truer than the consequence; and a negation 
assertion is an implication assertion whgse consequence is absolute falsehood. 
To make all this precise, given a structure .F for L and a formula 40 of L, let v be a function 
from a set I/ of variables of L, containing all free variables of cp, into the domain X of ,F. We 
denote by q(v) the truth-value of cp at v, and we define this notion inductively as follows. 
If pm is an m-place predicate symbol of L whose interpretation in Z is P,,,, and x1,. . .,x, are 
variables of L, then 
(P) Pm(X1,. . ., %A(4 = P,MXlL . . ., ~hd. 
If I+? and 0 are formulae of L, and we write, here and in the sequel, E 2 6 for max(O,E - 6), where 
E and 6 are real numbers, then 
(1) (1Mv) = 1 - VW, 
(v) (ICI v @(v) = min(vG), W)), 
(ti * 0) = maxW(v), W), 
(-) (I) + e)(u) = e(v) I l)(v). 
If we write $ c-t 8 for (II/ -+ 0) A (0 + +), we obtain from ( A ) and (4) for any two formulae 1,5 
and 0 of L. 
(4 04 t-* exv) = w(v) - wl. 
If x 1,. . .,x, are the free variables of the formula + of L, for some positive integer m, and if for 
any integer j s.t. 1 < j G m, for any function v as above and for any element x of X we write u( j/x) 
for the function identical with v except that 4 j/x)(xj) = x, then 
(3 (3xjti)(u) = $ $(v( j/x)), 
Note that if we admit only the values 0 (for “true”) and 1 (for “false”) the rules above reduce to 
the rules of classical two-valued logic. That is, in this case it follows from our rules that: a negated 
assertion is true iff the corresponding non-negated assertion is false; an “or” assertion is true iff at 
least one of its two parts is true; an “and” assertion is true iff both parts of it are true; an implication 
assertion is true iff its antecedent is false and/or its consequence is true; an existentially quantified 
formula is true iff the corresponding non-quantified formula is true for at least one element; a 
universally quantified formula is true iff the corresponding non-quantified formula is true for all 
elements under consideration. 
We continue the analogy with classical two-valued logic, and with the Lukasiewicz multi-valued 
logic, as we turn now to deal with deduction. This brings us to the central and novel feature of 
our logic, and it is here that our reversed semantics will be most helpful. 
A deduction is an expression of the form r !- A (read: “from r deduce A”), where l’- and A are 
finite lists of formulae of L. In classical ogic we say that the deduction r 1 A holds in a structure 
X for L iff throughout X whenever all elements of r are true at least one element of A is also true. 
To formalize this, using our notations above, let us write A r for the conjunction of all formulae 
in r, v A for the disjunction of all formulae of A, =S for implication outside L and V for the set of 
all variables appearing free in members of the lists r and A. Then we say that r t A holds in X iff 
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for every function u from I/ into the domain X of 5?, 
W) (AI-)(v)=O=(vA)(u)=O. : 
When we move to [O, 1 J-valued logic we can keep the definition of deduction as in (LL), and we 
shall call the logic thus obtained Lukasiewicz logic [hence the notation (LL)], as, according to, for 
example, Smiley’s comment on Scott [6], this will come closest to Lukasiewicz’s original intention. 
However, this will ignore altogether the possibility of error, and thus Scott has suggested instead 
the definition that I k A is to hold in % iff for every u as above, 
(LI) ( A TXu) 2 ( v AMu). 
In previous studies [8-lo] we employed the logic based on this type of deduction, calling it “the 
logic of inexactness” (LI), to axiomatize in it certain theories of behavioural sciences (measurement 
theories, choice theories, a geometry of visual perception etc.). Later, however [e.g. 11, 123, we 
proposed a new logic, which seems to capture neatly the idea that in science, while error cannot 
be eliminated, it can be brought under control. In this logic, which we called “the logic of 
approximation” (LA), a deduction It A holds in a given structure if truth is “very closely” 
approached in A whenever it is “closely enough” approached in r. More precisely, we say that 
I I- A holds in $5 (and _!E is a model of r F A) iff for every positive real number E there is a positive 
real number 6 s.t. for each u as above, 
(LA) ( A r)(0) < 6 => ( v A)(u) < E. 
Note that the three types of deduction, as defined in (LL), (LI) and (LA), coincide if we only 
admit the values 0 and 1. In this case, adopting the convention that the maximum of the empty 
set is 0, we have that a deduction I F A holds in a structure x iff its “one-sided transform” F A I + 
v A holds in x2”. 
If all numbers in the interval [O, 1) are admitted as truth-values, the deductions (LL), (LI) and 
(LA) coincide only when attention is restricted to empty Ts. (Adopting the convention above, under 
each of the three definitions the deduction tA holds in a structure f for L iff ( v A)(u) = 0 for every 
u as before.) In this case the equivalence of a deduction and its one-sided transform (where I is 
not empty) holds only under (LI), i.e. only in the logic of inexactness. Yet, it follows from the last 
two sentences that the deduction I1 A under (LI) is equivalent also to its one-sided transform 
under (LL) and (LA). In particular, this means that everything we did in our earlier papers using 
the logic of inexactness, can also be done with the logic of approximation, taking one-sided 
transforms of the relevant deductions. We shall use this fact later on, as in this paper we deal solely 
with the logic of approximation, which is intuitively appealing (as we explained above) and leads 
to rich and plausible theories (as we hope to show below). 
The main points of the last two paragraphs are summarized in the following theorem, where we 
write I t-LA, I t, A and I t-, A to say that the deduction I t A holds in a given structure under, 
respectively, the Lukasiewicz logic, the logic of inexactness and the logic of approximation. We 
also add another theorem which closes Section 1, giving a second (equivalent) definition to deduction 
in our logic of approximation. 
Theorem 1 
(A) If only 0 and 1 are admitted as truth-values, then for any two finite lists, I and A, of formulae 
of L, 
(B) If all numbers in [0, l] are admitted as truth-values (degrees of error), then for any two finite 
lists, I and A, of formulae of L, 
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Theorem 2 
Let _Y be a structure for L with domain X, r and A finite lists of formulae of L, and V the set 
of variables of L appearing free in the lists r and A. Then S is a model of the deduction r t A (in 
the logic approximation) iff for every sequence {u,: 1 < n < co} of functions from V into X, 
lim A T(v,) = 0 = ,llma v A(u,) = 0. n-+cc 
A discussion of (most parts of) Theorem 1 can be found in Ref. [12] and a proof of Theorem 2 
is provided in Ref. [I 11. 
2. AXIOMS AND REPRESENTATION 
Our aim in this section is to employ the logic of approximation in axiomatizing and modelling 
elementary (inexact) utility theory. We start with letting our formal language L contain two binary 
predicate symbols p and i, representing preference and indifference, and a ternary predicate symbol 
b representing betweenness. Preference and indifference, as is well-known, are the two basic 
predicates of any axiomatic utility theory [e.g. 13,141. They may be considered special cases of 
dominance and proximity (or similarity), which are, in turn, the basic predicates of social and 
behavioural inquiry [e.g. 151. Betweenness may be viewed as undirected preference. 
We read the formulae i(x, y), p(x, y) and b(x, y, z), where x, y, z are variables of L, as asserting 
that, respectively, “the elements to which x and y refer are indifferent”, “the element to which x 
refers is preferred to the element o which y refers” and “the element o which y refers is (in terms 
of preference ordering) between the elements to which x and z refer”. We note that our preference 
predicate is non-strict w.r.t. the indifference predicate, so that throughout this paper, except where 
we speak of definite preferences, the expression “preferred to” is short for “preferred to or indifferent 
from”. 
When dealing with the three predicates above, one often encounters various problems resulting 
from “inconsistencies” in human behaviour. There is, for instance, the dispersive nature of repetitive 
experiments: given two objects, x and y, a subject may sometimes prefer x to y, sometimes prefer 
y to .Y and sometimes be indifferent between them [e.g. 163. Another example is the intransitivity 
of preference: given three objects, x, y, z, a subject may prefer x to y and y to z and yet be indifferent 
between x and z or even prefer z to x [e.g. 171 so that y is not exactly “between” x and z. 
One way to tackle these difficulties is to make our predicates multi-valued. This is common 
practice in the literature on similarity (a close relative of indifference, as we mentioned above), 
including works using multi-dimensional scaling techniques [e.g. 18, 193, where similarity is 
represented by a metric structure with distances corresponding to dissimilarities. 
Alternatively the various predicates may be kept two-valued by choosing a cut-point and 
stipulating, for example, that a subject (definitely) prefers x to y iff he prefers x to y in at least half 
the cases. Then we may still have a metric representation, but we impose a minimal gap, of size E 
say, which must be reached or exceeded between (the representations of) two objects if one of them 
is to be considered preferred to the other (otherwise they are indifferent). Along these lines conditions 
were provided by Scott and Suppes [20] and Roberts [21,22] which, if satisfied by the relations 
of preference, p, indifference, i, and betweenness, b, on a set X, guarantee the existence, for every 
positive number E, of a real-valued (utility) function u on X, s.t. for all x, y, ZEX: 
p(x, y) = 0 *u(x) - U(Y) 2 E, 
i(x, y) = 00 [u(x) - u(y)1 < E 
and 
b(x, y, z) = 0 0 b(x) - U(Y)1 + MY) - 441 - b(x) - u(dl -= 2E. 
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Here we use the notation of Section 1. Thus p, i, b are interpretations of p, i, b, respectively [so 
that, for example, p(x,y) = p(x, y)(u), where a(x) = x and v(y) = y], and 0 denotes truth. And this 
brings us back to our logic of approximation where 0 need not be one of only two truth-values, 
and metric representations need not be cut to two-valuedness at any specific E point. What we do 
is bring together the two approaches in the preceeding paragraphs. For instance, any value in [0, I] 
obtained for some x and y from a suitable metric (sometimes from [u(x) - u(y)l, with appropriate 
u) will be admissible as a value of i(x, y), as in the multi-valued approach. Yet, such values will 
designate degrees of error and not sizes of indifference; indifference (like the other predicates) has 
no size-for any two elements it can only either hold or not hold, as in the two-valued approach, 
even though the statement in L that it holds may be erroneous in a structure for L to a varying 
degree. 
We achieve the goal set above by writing axioms (deductions) in L which have the following 
properties. When interpreted in a structure for L two-valuedly they make indifference an equivalence 
relation, preference an ordering relation and betweenness an undirected ordering relation. When 
interpreted multi-valuedly, under our special logic of approximation, they make indifference a 
(pseudo-)metric, preference an approximation to ordering and betweenness an approximation to 
undirected ordering. Our axiomatic theory of indifference, preference and betweenness is the 
following list of deduction expressions in L (we use bold-faced letters for “names” of deductions in 
L and ordinary letters for “names” of their interpretations in a structure for L): 
W 
(SY) 
Or) 
(co) 
(pt) 
(pr) 
(as) 
(h), 
(h), 
(h), 
(I& 
(h), 
(I.96 
t- ik 9, 
k ik y) + i(y, xl, 
k ik y) + My, 4 -+ i(x, z)), 
t Pk Yh tiY9 4, 
k Pk Y) + MY, 4 + P(% z)), 
1(x, Y) k ~6, Y), 
~6, Y), P(Y, x) t- I(x, Y), 
b Qx, Y, 4, QY, z, 4, Qz, x, Y), 
Qx, Y-4 k Qz, Y, x), 
I(x, Y) k Qx, Y, z), 
b(x, Y, x) k 1(x, Y), 
QXI 9 Y9 4, QY, z, 4 k i(y, ~1, Qx,, Y, x2), 
Qx,, x2,4, Qx2, x3, zb Qx,, x2, x3), i(x,, 4 A i(x,, z). 
The axioms above are split into three groups. The first group, dealing solely with indifference, 
consists of the first three deductions-reflexitivity (re), symmetry (sy) and transitivity (tr). The 
second, dealing with preference and its relation to indifference, consists of the next four deductions- 
connectedness (co), preference transitivity (pt), preference reflexivity (pr) and anti-symmetry (as). 
The third, dealing with betweenness and its relation to indifference, consists of the last six 
deductions-(b), through (b)6, which are modelled after Tarski’s [23] axioms for elementary 
geometry as restricted to the uni-dimensional case in Roberts [22]. 
If a structure X for L is a model of the first group of axioms we call it an indifference model, 
or an i-model. Then we have for all x, y, z in the domain X of 57, 
(re) i(x, x) = 0, 
(SY) ik v) = i(y, 4, 
(tr) i(x, y) + i(y,z) 2 i(x,z). 
So i is a [0, II-valued pseudo-metric on X. If we only allow the values 0 and 1 we obtain the 
discrete pseudo-metric, i.e. an equivalence relation. If we allow all values in [O, l] we obtain an 
arbitrary pseudo-metric. We note that these three deductions are one-sided and hence easy to 
interpret. In the next section we shall add to indifference a two-sided deduction scheme of 
substitutability, which will play an important role in our theory. 
If a structure SY for L is a model of our first two (one-sided) deductions for preference we call it 
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a preference model, or a p-model. In this case we have for all x, y, z in the domain X of 3, 
(4 minMx, Y), P(Y, 4) = 0, 
(pt) PC? Y) + P(Y, 4 a PC% 4. 
If this structure is also a model of our axioms for indifference and of the remaining two axioms 
for preference (the two-sided axioms tying preference to indifference) we call it an indifference- 
preference model or an ip-model. Then we have, in addition to the above, for every E > 0, a 6, > 0 
and a ~3~ > 0 s.t. for all x, y in X, 
(pr) i(x,y) < 61 =Pb,y) < E, 
max(p(x, y), p(y, x)) < 62 * f(x, Y) < e. 
Note that from (co) in a p-model, and either from (co) or from (pr) together with (re) in an 
ip-model, we can derive a weak reflexivity axiom for preference, namely 
By the way, (re) itself is a derived axiom in an ip-model, following from (co) and (as). Note also 
that we have the following weaker forms of indifference symmetry and transitivity in an i-model 
and of preference transitivity in a p-model: 
w 
(WI 
(P% 
OrI2 
(Pfl2 
i(x, y) t- i(y, xl 
ik Y) t- i(y, 4 + 0, 8 
PC% Yl t P(Y, 4 + PCG z) 
i(x, y), icy, 4 k i(x, 4 
Pb, Yh P(Y, 4 t PO4 z)* 
However, we do not have in general the following stronger forms of transitivity (if we have the 
first of these in an i-model then i is an ultra-metric as in, for example, Johnson [24]): 
(ff13 k (i(x, Y) A i(y, 8) -+ ik 4, 
(Pf)3 k (P(X, Y) A P(Y, x)) + P(x, x). 
Turning to betweenness, we find that our first two axioms for this predicate are connectedness 
and symmetry axioms. If a structure X for L is a model of these axioms then for every E > 0 we 
can find a 6 > 0 s.t. for all x, y, z in the domain X of .%, 
04, mW(x, Y, 4, My, z, 4, Hz, x, y)) = 0, 
(W2 b(x, y, z) < 6 * b(z, y, x) c E. 
The next two axioms provide simple and natural ties between indifference and betweenness. If 
the structure 3 is a model of these axioms then for each E > 0 there are 6r, ~5~ > 0 s.t. for all x, y, 
z in X, 
(bh 4x, y) < 6, * b(x, Y, 4 -c E, 
(bL b(x, y, x) c S2 * i(x, y) < E. 
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The remaining two axioms are transitivity axioms for betweenness. If the above S is a model of 
these axioms then for every E > 0 we can find 6,, Sz > 0 s.t. for all xi, x2, x3, y, z in X, 
max(b(x, , y, 4 NY, z, x2)) < 6, * minO(y, 4, WI, Y, x2)) < E, 
(bh m-Mb,, x2, 4, b(x2, x3, 4) < d2 =- minMx19 ~2, xd, mW(x2, 4, k, 4)) < E. 
A structure $Y for L which is a model of our six axioms for betweenness will be called a 
betweenness model, or a b-model. If it is also a model of our three axioms for indifference we shall 
call it an indifference-betweenness model, or an ib-model. If in addition it is a model of the four 
axioms for preference, i.e. if it is a model of all thirteen axioms of our theory above, we call it a 
total model or a t-model. 
In the discussion above deductions appearing in our formal theory were also called “axioms”. 
For these deductions we showed how they translate from the language L to an appropriate model 
.%. We do not usually do so for other deductions, assuming that the translations of axioms provide 
ample illustration of the process. Thus, for instance, the translations (pb),, (pb), and (pb), of the 
deductions (pb),, (pb), and (pb),, which are the focus of attention in the next few paragraphs, 
should be obvious in view of the examples discussed above. 
We now want to deal with the reduction of betweenness to preference as hinted in the opening 
paragraph of this section. For this we have the following (preference-betweenness) deductions and 
theorem: 
#4t Pk Y), dy, 4 I- b, Y, z), 
(pb), dz, Y), dY, x) 1 b(x, Y, 4, 
Theorem 3 
(i) Any ip-model which is also a model of (pb),, (pb), and (pb), is a t-model. (ii)Any ib-model 
which is .also a model of (pt), (pb), , (pb), and (pb), is a t-model. 
Proof. (i) We have to show that (b), through (b)6 hold in any ip-model 3 if it is also a model of 
the three pb-deductions. We illustrate the proof by looking at the axiom whose verification is least 
trivial, namely (b)6. So let some E > 0 be given. Using (pb),, (pb), and (as) we can find 6,, b2, 
d3 > 0 s.t. for every x1, x2, x3, z in the domain X of x, 
maxMxl,x2),dx2,xd < 4 =Wt,x2,x3) < -s 
maxMx3,x2),dx2,xd) < a2 *b(xt,x2,x3) < E, 
maxW2, 4, P(z, x2)) < a3 = G2, 4 < E, 
maxb4x3, 4, P(Z, x3)) < 6, * 4x3, 4 < E. 
We fix such 6,, &, 6, and then from (pt) we obtain for every x2, x3, z in X, 
mW(x2~xAd:x3,zN < b/2 =dx2,z) < S3, 
max(pk 4, dx,, x2)) -= b/2 * dz, x2) < S3, 
max(&,x2),dx2,4) < b/2 =-P&,z) < S,, 
max@(z, x2), dx2, xd) < b/2 + dz, x3) < S3. 
Finally, we verify (b)6 by setting 6’ = min(b,, 6,, S,/2) and then using (pb), to find a 6 > 0 s.t. for 
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all x1, x2, x3, z in X we have 
WI 9x2,4 < S - mWM&, x2), P(x,, 41, max@(z, x2), p(x,, x1))) < 6’, 
b(x2, X398 < 6 - min(maxMx2, x3), p(x3, z)), max(p(z, x3), p(x3, x2))) < 6’. 
(ii) We have to show that (co), (pr) and (as) hold in any ib-model which is also a model of (pt), 
(pb)l, (pb), and (pb),. With E- and S-calculations as above it is easy to check that in such a model: 
from (b),, (pt) and (pb),, follows (co); from (b)3 and (pb),, follows (pr); and from (b).+, (pb), and 
(pb), , follows (as). 0 
The situation now is that betweenness and indifference have both been “reduced” to preference 
[betweenness in (pb), , (pb), and (pb), and indifference already in (pr) and (as) of the formal theory 
together with (sy) or (ws)]. Our next step is to reduce preference itself (followed by the other two 
predicates, using the reductions above) to utility. We assume that the language L contains a unary 
predicate symbol u, and we say that u is a utility. predicate in a given structure !Z for L if 55 is a 
model of the following utility-preference deductions: 
(UP)1 dx, Y) l- U(Y) + n(x), 
(UP)2 U(Y) + u(x) k Pk Y). 
The formula u(x) of L is interpreted as asserting that the object to which x refers is “utilizable” 
(or “beneficial” or “gainful”). Thus (uP)~ and (uP)~ tell us that the object to which x refers is preferred 
to the one to which y refers iff the latter being utilizable implies the former being utilizable. Note 
that u says nothing about sizes of utility. Utility, like preference and the other predicates, has no 
size in our system. We speak only about elements being utilizable or non-utilizable, though these 
assertions have varying degrees of error, as we now explain. 
In a structure % for L with domain X (and interpretation u of u) the truth-value attached to 
u(x) at some point, x say, of X (i.e. the value of u(x) in [0, l]), is the error in asserting u(x) at x. 
The smaller this error, the truer the assertion that x is utilizable. So u can be regarded as a reversed 
utility function over X (even though its values, as stated above, are not utility magnitudes). Indeed 
we shall consider below cases where u behaves very much like a (reversed) utility function. But 
first, in the following theorem, whose proof is quite simple, we use the reduction of preference to 
utility in (uP)~ and (uP)~ to reduce also indifference and betweenness to utility. The theorem shows 
that if preference is reducible to utility then indifference and betweenness are reducible to utility 
iff they are reducible to preference. 
Theorem 4 
Let u be a utility predicate in the structure .!F for L. Then: (i) the structure 3 is a model of (pr), 
(as) and (ws) iff it is a model of the following utility-indifference deductions: 
Wl i(x, y) t- u(x) - 6% 
042 u(x) - U(Y) k 0, Y); 
(ii) the structure 2” is a model of (pb),, (pb), and (pb), iff it is a model of the following utility- 
betweenness deductions: 
W-4 1 u(x) + U(Y), U(Y) + 44 k w, Y, z), 
W2 44 -+ U(Y), U(Y) -+ u(x) 1 w, y, z) 
W3 b(x, Y, 4 t (4~) + U(Y)) * (U(Y) + u(z)), (u(z) -, U(Y)) A MY) -+ u(x)). 
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From reduction we now turn to full representation, where utility predicates will play precisely 
the role usually played by utility functions. Given a structure % for L, we shall say that the predicate 
u of L represents: preference in I if % is a model of the one-sided transforms of (uP)~ and (up)*; 
indifference in x if 55 is a model of the one-sided transforms of (ui)l and (ui)2; and betweenness in 
S if % is a model of the one-sided transforms of (ub), , (ub)2 and (ub)g. In other words, u represents 
preference, indifference or betweenness in % if A? is a model of, respectively, 
(P) t tix, Y) e, MY) + W)~ 
(1) k i(x9 Y) - (u(x) c-, U(Y)), 
(W t b(x, Y, 4 +-+ (((W + U(Y)) * MY) + u(z))) v ((u(z) --* U(Y)) A (NY) + u(x)))- 
Thus, representations can be stated in the formal language L itself, which is a unique feature of 
our multi-valued approach (and utility, as we saw previously in the various reduction axioms given 
above, can be a part of the formal theory and not merely an external function as it is in usual 
treatments of utility theory). Yet, when translated to x the representations above look pretty much 
like orthodox ones (and the utility predicate becomes an “ordinary” utility function). In fact we get 
multi-valued analogues of the representations in Scott and Suppes [20] and Roberts [21,22], as 
shown at the beginning of this section; namely, we have for all x, y, z in the domain X of 3, 
(P) PC&Y) = 44 L 4Yh 
(1) kY) = b(x) - 4Y)L 
(W b(x, y, z) = min(max(u(x) -I u(y), u(y) 1 u(z)), max(u(z) 2 u(y), u(y) 1 u(x))) 
or, equivalently for betweenness, 
09 b(x, Y, 4 = l p(x) - U(Y)1 + b(Y) - WI - I44 - 44l). 
Just as we wrote representation statements in L, we can write in L conditions guaranteeing the 
existence of such representations, i.e. we can have an axiomatic representation theory in the formal 
language itself. We first consider the following linearity deduction for indifference and directionality 
deduction for preference: 
(li) t- (i(x, y) -+ i(y, 4) -+ i(x, 4, 
(i@, xl -+ i(x, Y)) + i(z, Y), 
My, 4 3 i(z, x)1 -+ i(y, 4; 
(di) I- Pb Y) A Pk 4 A Pk Y), 
(MY, 4 + tix, z)) --, PC% Y)) A Pk Y), 
((Pk x) + Pk Y)) + Ph Y)) A PC% 4, 
((Pk Y) + PO& Y)) + PC& z)) A P@, xl A P(Y, z). 
The first of these two deductions tells us that of each three “points” one is “between” the two 
others, so that indifference is “linear”. (This is a rigorous connectedness axiom for betweenness, 
expressed in terms of indifference.) The second says that each three “points” are “ordered” from 
the least to the most preferred (or vice versa), so that there is a certain “direction” to preference. 
To see all this more clearly note that the structure 3 for L with domain X is a model of these 
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deductions [and of (re), (sy), (tr), (co) and (pt)] iff for every x, y, z in X: 
(li) either i(x, z) = i(x, y) + i(y, z), 
ori(y,z) = i&x) + i(x,z), 
or i(x, y) = i(x, z) + i(z, y); 
(di) either p(x, y) = p(x, z) = p(z, y) = 0, 
or P(X, Y) = P(X, 4 - P(Y, 4 and pk y) = 0, 
or P(X, Y) = P(z, Y) 1 P(Z, 4 and fix, 4 = 0, 
or p(x, z) = p(x, y) -1 p(z, y) and p(z, x) = p(y, z) = 0. 
Representation existence conditions are now given in Theorems 5 and 6. The first of these theorems 
formulates conditions for preference representation and for derived representations of indifference 
and betweenness. The second provides simultaneous representations for indifference and betweenness 
independently of preference. Representations of indifference and betweenness independent of each 
other, as well as derived representations of preference can be found in Refs [8-lo]. 
Theorem 5 
Let .!Z be a structure for L with domain X. Then: (i) we can add a unary predicate symbol u to 
L to represent preference in 35 as in (P), i.e. we can build a [0, I]-valued function u on X satisfying 
(P) (and consider it the interpretation in 2- of a new predicate u of L), iff X is a model of (co), (pt) 
and (di); (ii) the same predicate u represents also indifference in .% as in (I), iff 3 is, in addition to 
the above, a model of (sy) and of the one-sided transforms of (pr) and (as); (iii) the same predicate 
u represents also betweenness in .Y as in (B), iff % is, in addition to the above, a model either of 
the one-sided transforms of (pb),, (pb), and (pb),, or of the one-sided transforms of (b), through 
(b)6 with (b)3 first strengthened to 
L-b13 My, 4 + i(z, x1) -+ Vx, y) k W, y, 4. 
Proof. The necessity parts of all three clauses are a matter of routine computation, showing that 
if the representations exist then the relevant deductions hold in A?. In the sufficiency part of(i) we 
choose an arbitrary element zi of X, we let 
p = supP(z,,x), 
XX 
and for each x in X we set 
u(x) = 
i 
P + p(x,z,) if p(x,zl) > 0 
P - p(z,,x) if p(x,zI) = 0. 
To complete the proof of (i) take any two “points” x and y in X, look at all possible “locations” 
of these points w.r.t. z1 as allowed by (di), and check that the required result (P) is obtained in 
each case. The claims of (ii) and (iii), namely, that for this u we have (I) and (B), then follow from 
the fact that under the conditions of these clauses we have the following preference-indifference, 
preference-betweenness and indifference-betweenness identities for all x, y, z in X: 
(pi) 4x, Y) = max(p(x, Y), Pcv, xh 
(pb) b(x, Y, 4 = min(max(p(x, y). P(Y, zh maxW, Y), dv. x)h 
b(x, y,z) = i(i(x. y) + i&z) - 4x,4). Cl 
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We note that [bls, which is to be used when the derivation of (ib) from our betweenness axioms 
is carried out explicitly, is stronger than (b)3 in the multi-valued case but equivalent to it in the 
two-valued case. We also note that the structure % here is, in particular, a p-model in (i), an ip- 
model in (ii), a t-model in (iii) and an ib-model in the next theorem which concludes this section. 
Theorem 6 
Let ?Z be a structure for L with domain X. Then we can add a predicate symbol u to L to 
represent indifference and betweenness in 3Y as in (I) and (B), i.e. we can define a [0, l]-valued 
function u on X satisfying (I) and (B) (and consider it the interpretation in g of a new predicate u 
of L), iff !Z is an i-model and a model of the one-sided transforms of (b), through (b)6 with (b)3 
first strengthened to [b13. 
Proof. Once again we concentrate on sufficiency. This time we first (easily) establish the connection 
(ib) above between indifference and betweenness. Then we choose arbitrary elements zi and z2 in 
X s.t. i(zl, z2) > 0 (if there are no such two elements in X the case is trivial), we let 
k z,), 
and for each x in X we set 
u(x) = I I + i(x,z,) if b(x,z1,z2) > 0 [I - i(x, zl) if b(x, zl, z2) = 0. 
As in the case of the preceding theorem, to complete the proof take any two “points” x and y in 
X, look at their possible “locations” w.r.t. z1 and z2 according to (li), and check that in each case 
the required result, (I) and (B), is obtained. cl 
3. SUBSTITUTION AND COMPLETION 
Let L be a formal language as above, containing in particular the predicate symbols p, i, b (for 
preference, indifference, betweenness, respectively), and let u be a unary predicate symbol of L. If 
a structure _Y for L is an i-model, then in view of (sy) the deduction (ui)l (one of those we used to 
reduce i to u) can be written in the form 
ik Y) t- u(x) -+ U(Y). 
This deduction states that in u-assertions indifferent objects are substitutable for each other, i.e. 
that utilizability of one of them implies utilizability of the other (assuming that u-assertions deal 
with utility). In the logic of approximation this statement has the subtler meaning that if two 
objects are “practically” indifferent then the gap between the errors in the assertions that they are 
utilizable must be rather small. What we have here is uniform continuity of the interpretation u of 
u w.r.t. the pseudo-metric i induced by i on the domain X of an i-model 5Y. Such an .Y is a model 
of the deduction above if for every E > 0 there is a 6 > 0 s.t. for all x and y in X, 
i(x, y) < 6 * lu(x) - u(y)/ C .s. 
In any i-model .X we also have substitutability for i itself in its two places. That is to say, .“r is 
a model of the following two deductions [both of these are weak forms of transitivity, like (tr), of 
the preceding section. derived in .‘I’ from (tr) together with (sy). and translated to uniform continuity 
564 M. KATZ 
conditions over the domain of x.1: 
i(x, Y) t i(x, 4 + i(y, z), 
i(x, y) k i(z, x) -+ i(z, y). 
If .Y is an ip-model we also have substitutability, translating again to uniform continuity, for 
preference in its two places. Such an .CF, by (sy), (pr) and (pt), is a model of the deductions 
i(x, Y) k ~6, z) + P(y, 4, 
i(x, Y) t tic 4 + I+, y). 
We can extend the notion of substitutability as uniform continuity to betweenness in its three 
places, i.e. stipulate that the structure S be a model of 
i(x, 39 k b(x, x2, x3) -+ MY, x2, x3), 
ik Y) t b(x,, x, 4 + WI, Y, x3), 
i(x,y)~b(xl,x2,x)~b(xI,x2,y). 
In fact, we are going to add a general substitutability axiom scheme to our formal theory. The 
scheme is 
(W i(x, y) t Pm(xl,. . , x,Wx) + Pm(xl~. . . v x,Kj/y) 
for any positive integer m, any m-place predicate symbol pm of L and any integer j s.t. 1 < j < m. 
Here, and in the following, if xi,. . . , x, are the free variables of a formula cp of L and 1 < j < m, 
then cp(j/z) is the formula of L obtained from c~ by substituting the variable z of L for each free 
occurrence of xj in cp. Similarly, if xi,. . . , x,,z are elements of the domain of a structure for L and 
l<j<mthen(x, ,..., x,)(j/z)is(x, )...) ~j-r,z,~j+i ,...) x,). Clearly an i-model 5Y with domain 
X and interpretation pm of pm is a model of (su) for p,,, iff for everyj as above and every E > 0 there 
is a 6 > 0 s.t. for all x, y, x1 ,..., x, in X, 
w 4x, Y) < 6 = lp&~,. . . , x,Hj/x) - pm(xl,. . ., x,N j/y)1 < E. 
At each coordinate j we may consider p,,, a family of unary functions on X, each member of the 
family being determined by a specific list of xs in the remaining m - 1 coordinates. Then (su) is an 
equicontinuity condition for each such j-family, since the choice of 6 for a given E is independent 
not only of the particular xs in coordinate j but also of the particular lists of xs in the other 
coordinates. This is a strong continuity condition, which can be shown to be equivalent o uniform 
continuity over the product space X”. That is to say, any model of (su) is a model of 
i(x,,yd,..., i(x,,y,)tp,(x,,...,x,)-*p,(y,,...,y,), 
so that for every E > 0 we can find a 6 > 0 s.t. for all x1,. . ., x,,y,, . . . ,y, in the domain of the 
model, 
More importantly, (su) is extendable from atomic to compound formulae of L as Theorem 7 
shows. This theorem completes the analogy between indifference and equality; in the models it 
describes (which we shall call “continuity models”) indifference is a natural approximation to 
equality, satisfying in an approximate manner reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and substitutability. 
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Theorem 7 
Let the i-model 5Y be a model of (su) for every positive integer m and every predicate symbol pm 
of L. Let cp be a formula of L with m free variables, x1,. . . , x,, for some positive integer m. Then 
for every integer j s.t. 1 < j < m, 9” is a model of the deduction 
so that for every such j and every E > 0 there is a 6 > 0 s.t. for each function u from the set 
{x,, . . . ,x,} into the domain X of X and for all x, y in X, 
Proof. By induction on the structure of cp. For atomic cps the theorem’s conclusion is just its 
premise. For the steps involving the convectives we need no more than ordinary uniform continuity 
at each coordinate of the interpretation of cp in % (as shown in Ref. [12]). 
Equi-continuity, i.e. the ability to choose appropriate 6s at each coordinate independently of 
what happens at the other coordinates, is required for the steps involving the quantifiers. Assuming 
that the theorem holds in the i-model S with domain X for the formula II/ whose free variables 
are xr,...,x,, for some positive integer m, we have to show that it holds in .% for 3x,$ and Vx,$ 
for any integer k s.t. 1 d k < m. Specifically, we have to show that for each integer j s.t. 1 < j < m 
and each E > 0 we can find 6 1, a2 > 0 s.t. for any function u from {x 1,. . . , x,) into X and for any 
x, y in X, 
i(x, y) < 6 1 = lf3yf $(u( j/x)(W) - $ t4uWyM&)) < E 
and 
when the induction hypothesis is that for every such j and every E > 0 there is a 6 > 0 s.t. for every 
u as above and all x, y, z E X, 
4x, Y) < 6 * I$M.d4Wz)) - Il/Mj/yM&9)l < E. 
The rest of the proof consists of assuming that for some E > 0 there is no 6, (or&,) as above and 
showing, through a series of approximations, that this leads to contradiction of the induction 
hypothesis (details can be found in Ref. [25]). cl 
Having extended substitutability to arbitrary formulae of L we recall that the restriction of 
substitutability to unary predicates is the first of the two deductions, (ui)l and (ui)2, used in Section 
2 to reduce indifference to utility. We shall now extend the second of these two deductions to 
arbitrary formulae of L, though in the slightly weaker form 
(4 q(j/x), cp(j/y) 1 i(x, Y), 
for some positive integer j, where again cp has m free variables, x1,. . . , x,, for some integer m s.t. 
1 G j d m. For the same cp and j we consider also the deduction 
(ex) k 3 xjrp. 
If the i-model % is a model of (su), (un) and (ex) for some such p, we may consider 50 a generalized 
566 M. KATZ 
utility formula in %. Alternatively, we may say that cp represents in a a function, whose values are 
given in coordinate j of the interpretation of cp and whose arguments are given in the remaining 
coordinates of this interpretation. Then (ex) asserts that a value “exists” for every list of arguments 
and (un) adds that this value is “unique” up to indifference. Of course, we have existence and 
uniqueness only in an approximate manner. For 95 is a model of (un) and (ex) for cp iff for some j
as above and every E > 0 there is some 6 > 0 s.t. for every function u from the set (xi,. . . ,x,> into 
the domain X of X and for all x, y in X, 
W 
In particular (ex) ensures us that cp approaches a zero-point, but not that it actually reaches such 
a point; there is no guarantee that there is an element x0 in X where absolute truth for ci is 
“attained”, i.e. where 
CpMi, ~0)) = 0. 
An i-model X with domain X is said to be complete if for every formula cp of L, every 
interpretation in X of the predicates appearing in cp, under which (su), (un) and (ex) hold for cp in 
S, and every function u from the set of variables of cp into X, there is an x0 in X satisfying (at). 
The expression “every interpretation” is meant to include newly defined interpretations in X for 
any predicate of L except i. Note that if cp has m free variables, then (su) is to hold (for cp in X) for 
each integer j s.t. 1 < j < m, while (un) and (ex) [and consequently also (at)] are to hold for one 
(and the same) such j. This model theoretic notion of completeness coincides with the analytic 
notion of completeness, namely that every Cauchy sequence attains a limit, as Theorem 8 shows. 
This theorem and its proof are re-formulations of theorems and proofs appearing in Refs [I 1,253. 
In the proof, newly defined interpretations of some predicates of L in X make no difference in the 
first half but are essential in the second. 
Theorem 8 
The i-model X with domain X is a complete model iff (X, i) is a complete metric space. (For 
simplicity we assume here that i is a metric, and not merely a pseudo-metric, on X.) 
Proof. Let the i-model X be s.t. (X,i) is a complete metric space, and let cp be a formula of L 
with free variables x1,. . . ,x,. If (ex) holds in X for cp and some j s.t. 1 <j < m, then, given any 
function 1’ from the set (xi,. . . , x,} into X, there is a sequence {x,: 1 < n < co} of elements of X 
s.t. for each n, cp(u(j/x,)) < l/n. If (un) also holds for these cp and j, then the sequence above is a 
Cauchy sequence and thus it attains a limit, x0 say. The continuity condition (su) for cp now implies 
that (at) holds with this x0. 
For the converse let {x,: 1 6 n < co} be a Cauchy sequence w.r.t. to the metric i in the domain 
X of the complete model X. Take some unary predicate symbol u of L and build for it an 
interpretation u in X by setting for each x in X, 
u(x) = lim i(x, x,). “+a 
Since the interval [0, l] with the usual metric forms a complete metric space this interpretation is 
well-defined. Also, under this interpretation (su), (un) and (ex) hold in X for u. Thus there is an x0 
in X s.t. u(xo) = 0, and clearly lim x, = x0. Cl x*oD 
Our notion of completeness in the logic of approximation bears a clear resemblance to various 
notions of completeness in other non-classical logics. For instance, in Scott [26] and in Mansfield 
[27] there is a similar notion of completeness for Boolean-valued models, and in Fourman and 
Scott [28] there is such a notion for sheaves. Both of these are on the one hand stronger than our 
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notion of completeness, in the sense that infq is attained in complete Boolean-valued models by 
every cp for which (su) alone holds, in complete sheaves by every cp for which (su) and (un) hold, 
and in our complete models by cps for which (su), (un) and (ex) hold. On the other hand, these 
notions of completeness will be weaker than ours if adopted in the logic of approximation, since 
they require (su) to hold in a form (like the strong transitivity in Section 2 of this paper) which is 
rather restrictive in our models. That none of (su), (un) and (ex) is redundant in the case of our 
notion of completeness can be seen from the simple counter-example where .Y is s.t. X = [l, 00) 
and interpretations of a binary predicate i and three unary predicates f, g, h are defined by setting 
for each x, y in X, 
$6~) = min(1, Ix - YI), 
f(x) = l/x, 
g(x) = 1, 
I 
2-x 
h(x) = 
if l<x<2 
1 
if 2<x<co. 
It is easy to check that (X, i) is a complete metric space, that (su) and (ex) but not (un) hold for f 
in .%, that (su) and (un) but not (ex) hold for g in 3?, that (un) and (ex) but not (su) hold for h in x^, 
and that none off, g, h attains a zero-point in X. 
Attaining a zero-point (a point of absolute truth) in coordinate j of (the interpretation of) ~0 for 
every list of xs in the remaining coordinates, is really essential if cp is to represent a function with 
values in coordinate j. Without this, for some lists of arguments the function will not have a definite 
value. This is why we need complete models, where every function attains a value for every 
appropriate list of arguments. Thus it will be nice to close this paper with a theorem showing that 
every continuity model (see Theorem 7 above) is extendable in a natural way to a complete model 
(which is also a continuity model, so we call it a “complete continuity model”). 
Theorem 9 
Every continuity model has an elementarily equivalent extension which is a complete continuity 
model. 
Proof. Given a continuity model % denote by .4? the extended model whose existence is asserted 
in the theorem. Let the domain X of $ be the metric completion of the domain X of .%. For 
simplicity we assume again that we deal with metrics rather than with pseudo-metrics, and we shall 
consider X as a subset of 8, identifying x with the equivalence class of (x,x, . . .) for any x in X. If 
for some positive integer m, pm is an m-place predicate symbol of L, we denote by pm and fi,,, the 
interpretations of p,,, in 9” and .!?‘, respectively. To define fi,,,, if (a,, . . . ,2,) is an element of Xm, let 
1(x 1,. . . ,x,),: 1 < n < co} be a sequence of elements of X” converging to (a,, . . . ,a,,,) and set 
(P) Bl# 1r...,%J = j;yPm(XIr . . . . -%A,. 
The uniform continuity of pm ensures us that fi,,, is well-defined and uniformly continuous, so that 
.@ is a continuity model. It is also a complete model since (8, i) is a complete metric space. The 
metric i w.r.t. which 8 is the metric completion of X is the interpretation of i in 5?‘, i.e. it is precisely 
what we obtain as a special case from (0) when pm is the metric i on X. And when we spoke about 
an equivalence class of (x,x, . . .), we meant, of course, the equivalence class modulo i = 0 for this 
extension i of i. 
Now, if cp is a formula of L with m free variables, xi,. . .,x,, for some positive integer m, and if 
0 is a function from the set {x1,. . . , x,> into d, we let {u,: 1 < n < CO} be a series of functions 
from {x1,..., x,} into X s.t. the image vectors (u,(xl), . . . , v,(x,)) converge to the image vector 
(4x,),..., 0(x,)). We want to show that 
If we do so we complete the proof of the theorem, since then whenever we deal with the special 
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case where the image vector (G(x,), . . . , 0(x,)) lies in X” we obtain identical values for cp(B) in x and 
in $, so that the two structures are elementarily equivalent (in the model-theoretic sense of this 
term). 
To verify (4) we use again induction on the structure of cp. For atomic cps, (4) is just (fi), and for 
the steps involving the connectives the verifications are straightforward. When we move to the 
quantifiers we have to show that the theorem holds for 3xj$ and Vxj$, assuming that it holds for 
$ (where the free variables of $ are xt,...,~,,,, and 1 < j < m). That is to say, using the induction 
hypothesis for $, we have to show that with B and u,s as above, 
and 
We do so by a series of approximations which allow us to interchange the lim criteria with inf 
criteria in the first case and the lim criteria with sup criteria in the second (details can be found in 
Ref. [25]). 0 
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